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Court Upholds Restrictions on Neonicotinoids – A Precautionary Approach to 
Evidence 
Emanuela Bozzini* and Elen Stokes** 
I. Background 
In August 2013, Bayer CropScience AG and Syngenta Crop Protection AG brought legal 
proceedings1 against the European Commission seeking to annul the Commission’s 
Implementing Regulation (EU) No 485/20132 that severely restricted the conditions of 
approval for three active substances – clothianidin, thiamethoxam, imidacloprid – used 
in plant protection products (PPPs).3 These substances are neonicotinoids (or ‘neonics’), 
a category of insecticide. Their safety was assessed in the late 2000s, and a broad range 
of uses was approved at EU level for a period of ten years.4 The 2013 Implementing 
Regulation restricted such approvals because the neonics were found to pose a 
potential, yet uncertain, risk to non-target organisms and specifically to pollinators.5  
The restrictions resulted from the decision of the Commission to re-evaluate the risks 
posed by neonics to bees, under the so-called ‘review procedure’.  Under Article 21 
Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009, at any point during the ten year approval period, the 
Commission can re-assess hazards and associated risks posed by a substance, 
provided that new evidence becomes available to suggest that the health and 
environmental protection goals established by Article 4 of that Regulation are no longer 
met. 
The applicants challenged the restrictions introduced by Regulation No 485/2013 and 
relied on similar pleas in law to bring their cases to the General Court. They argued, inter 
alia, that the Commission had no new evidence to justify the initiation of the review 
procedure, and that the relevant scientific data had been misinterpreted and ignored. 
They also submitted that the Commission had acted in breach of the precautionary 
principle and the principle of proportionality, in part because the Commission had not 
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1 Joined Cases T-429/13 and T-451/13, Bayer CropScience AG and Others v European Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2018:280.  
2 Implementing Regulation (EU) 485/2013 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 540/2011, as 
regards the conditions of approval of the active substances clothianidin, thiamethoxam and imidacloprid, 
and prohibiting the use and sale of seeds treated with plant protection products containing those active 
substances, OJ L 139, 25.5.2013, p. 12-26. 
3 Bayer markets clothianidin and imidacloprid; Syngenta markets thiamethoxam.  
4  Directive 2006/41/EC amending Directive 91/414 to include clothianidin and pethoxamid as active 
substances; Commission Directive 2007/6/EC of 14 February 2007 amending Directive 91/414 to include 
metrafenone, Bacillus subtilis, spinosad and thiamethoxam as active substances; Commission Directive 
2008/116/EC of 15 December 2008 amending Directive 91/414 to include aclonifen, imidacloprid and 
metazachlor as active substances, OJ L 187, 8.7.2006, p. 24-27. 
5 More precisely, in the Implementing Regulation the Commission prohibited the use of neonics in bee-
attractive crops (including maize, oilseed rape and sunflower), allowing some exception for winter cereals 
and for the treatment of some crops after flowering. The Regulation also permits uses in greenhouses.  
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carried out an impact assessment to evaluate the consequences of the Regulation No 
485/2013 before its adoption. Furthermore, the applicants alleged that the Commission 
had infringed their right to be heard during the review procedure, and that the contested 
measure breached their right to property and freedom to conduct a business.  
The General Court rejected all the claims made by the applicants.  
This commentary focuses on three prominent themes: the interpretation of the 
precautionary principle; the implications of a lack of impact assessment for risk 
management decisions; and the legitimate use of scientific data in risk assessment. The 
final section provides brief concluding remarks.  
  
II. Alleged Breach of the Precautionary Principle 
The precautionary principle is intended to ensure a high level of environmental protection 
in all the EU’s spheres of activity, by allowing EU institutions to take protective measures 
without having to wait until the reality and extent of those risks become fully apparent or 
until the adverse effects materialise.6 The principle is enshrined in the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU and is often included or reflected in EU secondary legislation.7 The 
parent Regulation of the contested measure explicitly states that its provisions are 
‘underpinned by the precautionary principle in order to ensure that active substances or 
products placed on the market do not adversely affect human or animal health or the 
environment’.8 The applicants claimed that, in imposing restrictions on the substances 
concerned, the Commission had made manifest errors of assessment and misapplied 
the precautionary principle.   
It is first worth noting that the Court’s treatment of the precautionary principle covers 
largely familiar ground.  There is a sizeable body of EU case law establishing that 
institutions acting on the precautionary principle are required to follow proper procedure.  
In line with previous cases, the Court explained that:  
within the process leading to the adoption by an institution of appropriate measures 
to prevent specific potential risks to public health, safety and the environment by 
reason of the precautionary principle, three successive stages can be identified: 
first, identification of the potentially adverse effects arising from a phenomenon; 
second, assessment of the risks to public health, safety and the environment which 
are related to that phenomenon; and, third, when the potential risks identified 
exceed the threshold of what is acceptable for society, risk management by the 
adoption of appropriate protective measures.9  
                                                          
6 Cases T-429/13 and T-451/13, Bayer CropScience AG and Others v European Commission (n 1), para 110. 
7 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 47-390, Article 191(2). 
8 Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 
concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market and repealing Council Directives 
79/117/EEC and 91/414/EEC, OJ L 309, 24.11.2009, p. 1-50, Art 1(4), see also recital 8. 
9 Ibid, para 111. 
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The risk assessment stage is subject to certain checks and balances.10  For example, 
the assessment is to be entrusted by the institutions to scientific experts, based on the 
best scientific data available and undertaken in an independent, objective and 
transparent manner.11  Although the assessment is not required to provide the institutions 
with conclusive evidence, a preventive measure ‘cannot properly be based on a purely 
hypothetical approach to risk, founded on mere conjecture which has not been 
scientifically verified’.12  It follows that ‘a preventive measure may be taken only if the risk 
… appears nevertheless to be adequately backed up by the scientific data available at 
the time when the measure was taken’.13 
The applicants alleged that the Commission’s restriction of the three active substances 
infringed the precautionary principle because purely hypothetical risks were taken into 
account, there was no adequate risk assessment, and the measures taken were 
disproportionate.14   
The Court separated out the claims into those relating to risk assessment and those 
relating to risk management.  There is a long tradition in EU risk regulation of treating 
risk assessment and risk management as cleanly distinct stages in the decision-making 
process.15  Accordingly, risk assessment is conceived as technical, expert-driven and 
value-neutral, whereas risk management involves the exercise of political choice in 
determining the level of risk deemed unacceptable for society and the appropriate means 
of protection.  This has consequences for the nature and intensity of judicial review of 
each of the respective stages, as these joined cases demonstrate. For current purposes, 
the point is to highlight that the line between risk assessment and risk management is 
not as clear-cut as suggested by the Court, because it falsely implies that certain 
decisions based on technical expertise do not also entail policy choices.16 
The Court held that there was no manifest error at the risk assessment stage and that, 
in this regard, the Commission had not misapplied the precautionary principle.17  The 
Court found that the risk assessment did not fail to take account of important scientific 
data,18 nor did it reflect a purely hypothetical approach to risk.19  The risk assessment 
was, in the Court’s view, conducted ‘in accordance with the scientific rules’20 and must 
be deemed to be scientifically sound since the applicants had not established that the 
                                                          
10 Ibid, para 112. 
11 Ibid, paras 115 and 117. 
12 Ibid, para 116. 
13 Ibid, para 120. 
14 Ibid, paras 334-335. 
15 See, for example, European Commission, Communication on the Precautionary Principle COM(2000) 1 
final, para 4. 
16 For general discussion, see, for example, E. Fisher, ‘Framing Risk Regulation: A Critical Reflection’ (2013) 
4(2) European Journal of Risk Regulation 125-132; S. Jasanoff, ‘The Songlines of Risk’ (1999) 8(2) 
Environmental Values 135-152. 
17 Cases T-429/13 and T-451/13, Bayer CropScience AG and Others v European Commission (n 1), paras 
580-582. 
18 Ibid, paras 355-382. 
19 Ibid, paras 383-415. 
20 Ibid, para 390. 
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assessment was defective.21  The Court cannot substitute its own assessment for that 
used by the Commission, and is empowered only to examine whether the risk 
assessment complied with what it called ‘general rules of evidence’22 and ‘important 
procedural guarantees … whose purpose is to ensure the scientific objectivity’.23  
Through this, risk assessment comes to be seen as a predominantly cognitive process 
of factual assessment and interpretation, not as a source of discretion involving matters 
of political choice or volition.24  In reality, however, technical assessments and policy 
choices are not so clearly separable.  
For example, one applicant alleged that the risk assessment was rushed because the 
Commission had imposed an excessively short deadline (five to eight months, depending 
on the starting date used), and that this undermined the quality and completeness of the 
scientific investigation.25  The Court rejected the claim,26 noting that the period allowed 
was ‘not unusual’.27  Moreover, because the Commission enjoyed a broad discretion in 
relation to risk management,  it was ‘fully entitled to take the view that the precautionary 
principle precluded the setting of a deadline … that would enable later scientific 
knowledge to be taken into account’.28  The point here is that the length of deadline will 
have materially affected the process if not the outcome of the risk assessment. 29  The 
deadline meant that the risk assessment was completed before a test guidance 
document was made available, which, the applicants claimed, ‘led to the facile and 
unscientific conclusion that a number of risks could not be excluded’.30  The Court 
disagreed, finding that, had the Commission waited until the guidance was finalised, it 
would ‘necessarily have delayed the Commission’s becoming aware, however 
imprecisely, as risk manager, of the level of risk posed by the substances covered and, 
as a result, the taking of a decision’.31  This suggests that political and technical 
assessments are closely interconnected.  The Commission’s decisions about deadlines 
and speed of process can hardly be described as merely technical or politically 
weightless – they involve value-laden choices about how quickly to respond, which in 
turn determines what is included and what is left out of the risk assessment.    
 
III. Lack of Impact Assessment 
The applicants further claimed that the Commission had breached the precautionary 
principle by failing to conduct an impact assessment of its restriction of the active 
                                                          
21 Ibid, para 390. 
22 Ibid, para 142. 
23 Ibid, para 147. 
24 See J. Mendes, ‘Bounded Discretion in EU Law: A Limited Judicial Review Paradigm in a Changing EU’ 
(2017) 80(3) Modern Law Review 443-472. 
25 Cases T-429/13 and T-451/13, Bayer CropScience AG and Others v European Commission (n 1), paras 
343-347. 
26 Ibid, paras 349-353. 
27 Ibid, para 351. 
28 Ibid, para 314. 
29 Ibid, see, for example, paras 365 and 393. 
30 Ibid, paras 306-310. 
31 Ibid, para 309. 
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substances, ‘which prevented [it] from appreciating the seriously damaging effects that 
the contested measure could have in economic and environmental terms’.32  Given that 
impact assessment falls within the remit of risk management (rather than of risk 
assessment), the Court examined not just the procedural guarantees but also the merits 
of the Commission’s action.  The Court noted that the 2000 Communication on the 
Precautionary Principle requires the Commission to have conducted a comparison of the 
most likely benefits and costs of action and lack of action, before taking any final decision 
as to the most appropriate course of action.33  The Communication states that, where 
appropriate and feasible, the examination of pros and cons should include an economic 
cost-benefit analysis, and include consideration of wider, non-economic factors.34  It is 
worth highlighting that more recent policy now makes clear that a proportionate impact 
assessment should be carried out ‘for every decision invoking the precautionary 
principle’.35  At the time, however, the authoritative statement on procedure was 
contained in the Communication, which does not prescribe a particular form of 
evaluation.  Because of this, the Court held that ‘it is not at all apparent that the authority 
concerned is obliged to initiate a specific assessment procedure culminating, for 
example, in a formal, written assessment report. In addition, it is apparent from the text 
that the authority applying the precautionary principle enjoys considerable discretion 
regarding methods of analysis’.36  Moreover, the Court found that: ‘it is not necessary for 
the economic analysis of the costs and benefits to be made on the basis of a precise 
calculation of the respective costs of the action proposed or of inaction.  Such precise 
calculations will in most cases be impossible to make, given that, in the context of the 
application of the precautionary principle, their results depend on different variables 
which are, by definition, unknown’.37 
In other words, the Court found that the Commission had satisfied the requirements of 
the Communication on the Precautionary Principle because it had ‘acquainted itself with 
the effects, positive and negative, economic and otherwise’.38  Interestingly, the 
Commission in its 2017 Better Regulation Toolbox appears to interpret the 
Communication on the Precautionary Principle differently, as signalling that all acts 
based on the precautionary principle should be based on a formal impact assessment 
(not the general balancing of issues accepted by the Court here).39   
In assessing the merits of the Commission’s examination of costs and benefits, the Court 
also concluded that the impact of the contested measure on agriculture and the 
environment seemed less significant than one of the applicants had claimed.40  It was 
particularly relevant that several Member States had previously suspended certain uses 
of the substances concerned, and that none of them had reported negative effects on 
                                                          
32 Ibid, para 456. 
33 Ibid, para 458. 
34 Communication on the Precautionary Principle (n 16), para 6.3.4. 
35 European Commission, Better Regulation Toolbox (European Commission 2017) 93. 
36 Cases T-429/13 and T-451/13, Bayer CropScience AG and Others v European Commission (n 1), para 459. 
37 Ibid, para 460. 
38 Ibid, para 460. 
39 Better Regulation Toolbox (n 37), 93 footnote 101. 
40 Cases T-429/13 and T-451/13, Bayer CropScience AG and Others v European Commission (n 1), para 463. 
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productivity or the environment.  The applicant took issue with this because the 
Commission ‘failed to conduct any investigation in that respect’ and ‘if one does not look 
one will not find’.41  The Court, however, took the absence of Member States reports to 
be crucial, concluding that the Commission ‘was entitled to rely on that silence and 
assume that there were no such consequences or, in any event, that they were 
insignificant’.42 
 
IV. Selection of Evidence in Article 21 Review Procedure 
The definition of the knowledge-base for risk assessment is a very sensitive issue. EU 
pesticide regulations establish in detail the data requirements for the approval and 
renewal of approval of substances.43 Conversely, criteria for the review of approvals are 
only partially defined: whereas there are indications of the data required to start a review, 
the evidence-base for the review itself is left unspecified. It is not surprising therefore 
that it became a matter of controversy in the context of the legal cases on 
neonicotinoids.44  
Article 21(1) Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 establishes the conditions to be met to start 
the review of the conditions of approval of a substance before its legal expiry date: the 
existence of ‘new scientific and technical knowledge and monitoring data’ that indicate 
that the substance might no longer satisfy the approval criteria. In the joined cases under 
discussion, the Commission was prompted to act by three peer-reviewed studies 
published in 2012,45 as well as by monitoring data gathered by national authorities.46 The 
applicants objected that such papers did not constitute ‘new’ evidence, because in their 
view they did not contain any new relevant scientific information.47   In rejecting this claim, 
the Court observed that ‘new’ has both a substantial and a temporal meaning. In 
                                                          
41 Ibid, para 465. 
42 Ibid, para 465. 
43 Commission Regulation (EU) No 283/2013 setting out the data requirements for active substances, in 
accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning 
the placing of plant protection products on the market, OJ L 93, 3.4.2013, p. 1-84; Commission 
Implementing Regulation (EU) No 844/2012 setting out the provisions necessary for the implementation 
of the renewal procedure for active substances, as provided for in Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council concerning the placing of plant protection products on the 
market, OJ L 252, 19.9.2012, p. 26-31. 
44 It might be useful to recall that the preliminary completeness check of a dossier is often controversial, 
even in the case of procedures of approval carried out according to detailed rules as set by Regulation 
283/2013. See E. Bozzini, Assessing Criteria and Capacity for Reliable and Harmonised ‘Hazard 
Identification’ of Active Substances (European Parliament Research Service 2018).  
45 In a first study, Henry and colleagues found that exposure to a non-lethal dose of thiamethoxam can 
impair the capacity of honey bees to safely return to their hive, thus increasing mortality rate and possibly 
leading to colony collapse. In a second study, Whitehorn and colleagues calculated that the growth rate 
of colonies of bumble bees treated with imidacloprid was significantly reduced compared to control 
colonies. Imidacloprid also had an impact on the production of new queens that was 85% lower in treated 
colonies compared to control ones. A third study published by Schneider et al. found that a decrease in 
foraging activities in bees exposed to sub-lethal doses of imidacloprid and clothianidin.  
46 See for example APENET, 2011. “Effects of coated maize seed on honeybees” Report based on results 
obtained from the third year (2011) activity of the APENET project. 
47 Cases T-429/13 and T-451/13, Bayer CropScience AG and Others v European Commission (n 1), para 177. 
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substantial terms, the Court accepted the argument proposed by the Commission – that, 
since the studies employed an innovative methodology, they provided the regulators with 
new knowledge, and more importantly with more reliable knowledge on the effects of 
neonics on bees.48 Furthermore, the Court observed that the studies were new in a 
temporal sense, because they had been published after the submission of the original 
dossier at the time of the first approval, which could therefore be taken as a reference 
date.49 In this sense, the term ‘new’ was understood in relation to the timing of the 
evaluation procedure of a specific substance. The Court therefore judged that the studies 
singled out by the Commission constituted a proper evidence-base lawfully to initiate the 
Article 21 review procedure.  
The review procedure was not, however, meant to be limited to the evaluation of the 
studies that prompted it, as these constituted only a limited selection of the available 
studies that might have qualified as ‘new’ according to the definition endorsed by the 
Court.50 Moreover, the review was not limited to an evaluation of new evidence – the 
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) (the expert body responsible for completing the 
assessment in this instance) also completed a re-assessment of the original dossier 
submitted by the applicants and of the data submitted to national authorities for the initial 
authorisation of the substances.  EFSA therefore performed a re-evaluation of (old) data 
already assessed by national and EU authorities, this time taking into account new legal 
requirements regarding pollinators51 as well as more recent criteria detailed by EFSA in 
its 2012 Opinion.52  
This brings us to discussion of a second claim advanced by the applicants in this context, 
namely that the re-evaluation was partial and ignored relevant scientific evidence 
(favourable to neonics) from literature data and monitoring studies. In the remainder of 
this section, we will focus on the claim that EFSA ‘decided to forgo entirely the customary 
detailed review of relevant peer-reviewed scientific literature’.53 Indeed, EFSA says it had 
taken into account ‘some literature data’,54 but there are no indications that a proper 
                                                          
48 Ibid, para 178 and 179. 
49 Ibid, para 172. 
50 A subsequent review on neonicotinoids carried out between 2015 and 2018 included hundreds of 
papers published since the mid-2000s. Fryday, S., Tiede, K. and Stein, J. (2015). 'Scientific services to 
support EFSA systematic reviews: Lot 5 Systematic literature review on the neonicotinoids (namely active 
substances clothianidin, thiamethoxam and imidacloprid) and the risks to bees', EFSA supporting 
publication 2015:EN-756 EFSA, 2018. Evaluation of the data on clothianidin, imidacloprid and 
thiamethoxam for the updated risk assessment to bees for seed treatments and granules in the EU. EFSA 
supporting publication 2018:EN-1378. 31 pp. doi:10.2903/sp.efsa.2018.EN-1378 
51 See point 3.8.3 Annex II Regulation (EC) 1107/2009. 
52 EFSA. (2012). 'Scientific Opinion on the science behind the development of a risk assessment of Plant 
Protection Products on bees (Apis mellifera, Bombus spp. and solitary bees)', EFSA  Journal  10, (5) pp. 
2668 
53 Cases T-429/13 and T-451/13, Bayer CropScience AG and Others v European Commission (n 1),  para 354 
54 EFSA. (2013b). 'Conclusion on the peer review of the pesticide risk assessment for bees for the active 
substance clothianidin', EFSA Journal  11, (1:3066); EFSA. (2013a). 'Conclusion on the peer review of the 
pesticide risk assessment for bees for the active substance thiamethoxam', EFSA Journal 11, (1:3067); 
EFSA. Ibid.'Conclusion on the peer review of the pesticide risk assessment for bees for the active substance 
imidacloprid', (1:3068)  
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search for the relevant open literature – according to the criteria laid down in EFSA 
Guidelines – had been undertaken.55  
The Court rejected this second claim, on the ground that there are no specific provisions 
under Article 21 Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 stating which types of evidence are to 
be included and excluded from the re-assessment. Accordingly, there were no 
obligations to include a literature review in the EFSA procedure. At the same time, the 
Court affirmed that ‘however, that does not mean that the relevant scientific literature 
does not have to be taken into consideration’.56 Where there is a lack of specific criteria 
for the selection of evidence in such a review procedure, some general principles hold; 
in particular, the Court observed that any assessment ‘should be based on the best 
scientific data available’.57 In addition, following the reasoning proposed by the Court in 
its discussion on the temporal dimension of the term ‘new’, it seems sensible to conclude 
that the review could include all studies on the particular active substances published 
since the original dossiers were submitted.58  
Both the general criteria for the quality of risk assessment and the logic of the 
argumentation advanced in the judgment could lead to the conclusion that a 
comprehensive assessment of the available scientific literature is necessary under the 
Article 21 review procedure, as it is in approval and renewals. This might prove crucial 
for the legitimacy and the transparency of the review, especially in cases like these 
discussed here, characterised by high levels of scientific uncertainty, or in cases where 
a weight of evidence approach is to be applied as in the evaluation of endocrine 
disrupting properties of chemicals.59 The Court, however, did not elaborate on this point, 
and in this sense the criteria for the legitimate selection of evidence in the context of a 
review procedure remain under-specified.  
 
Conclusions 
In substantial terms, the judgment will be of little consequence. In the time since the 
cases were brought in 2013, the regulatory debate on each of the three active 
substances has progressed substantially and the contested measure has now been 
superseded by new Implementing Regulations introduced by the Commission in 2018. 
The new measures are even more restrictive than the previous ones; notably, the 
                                                          
55 EFSA. (2011). 'Submission of scientific peer-reviewed open literature for the approval of pesticide active 
substances under Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009', EFSA Journal  9, (2) pp. 2092 The guidelines establish 
rules for searching in scientific databases (like PubMed, Web of Science), for the evaluation of the 
relevance of each paper retrieved, for the reporting on the search strategy, etc.  
56 Cases T-429/13 and T-451/13, Bayer CropScience AG and Others v European Commission (n 1),  para 
358. 
57 Ibid, para 117, 289 and 354. 
58 it could be noted that, since the four chemicals were first assessed under Directive 414/1991/EEC which 
did not require any analysis of open peer review literature, any paper published on the substances under 
review could be considered new and therefore be potentially of relevance for the re-assessment. 
59 See Annex to Commission Regulation (EU) 2018/605 amending Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 
1107/2009 by setting out scientific criteria for the determination of endocrine disrupting properties, OJ L 
101, 20.4.2018, p. 33-36. 
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Regulations forbid all outdoor uses of the three neonics.60 Yet, the judgment is of 
relevance for its discussion of some of the most controversial topics in pesticides 
regulation and more broadly risk regulation.61 
The Court followed a well-established line of reasoning, especially in its discussion of 
the precautionary principle. It also left some issues open and ultimately unresolved. The 
Court affirmed that the impacts of a proposed Implementing Regulation must be 
assessed at the risk management stage but did not accept that such an evaluation had 
to take a particular form.62 As noted, things have moved on since the Court heard and 
decided on the issues in these cases, and the updated Better Regulation package 
clarifies that a formal impact assessment is now expected whenever the precautionary 
principle is invoked – presumably this would also include its invocation in implementing 
measures. Furthermore, the Court did not fully clarify data requirements under the Article 
21 review procedure. The judgment signals that in many respects the adoption of 
implementing acts through comitology remains an obscure process.  
 
                                                          
60 For details of each substance, see the EU pesticide database at 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/pesticides/eu-pesticides-
database/public/?event=activesubstance.selection&language=EN  
61 See the evaluation reports published in Spring 2018: European Parliament Research Service. (2018). 
"Regulation (EC) 1107/2009 on the Placing of Plant Protection Products on the Market. European 
Implementation Assessment." EPRS, Bruxelles; Scientific Advice Mechanism. (2018). "EU Authorisation 
processes of Plant Protection Products." Group of Scientific Advisors, Bruxelles. 
62 It is of note that in a parallel case on the substance fipronil, the applicant, BASF Agro BV, had its request 
for annulment of the restrictive Implementing Regulation accepted on the basis of the lack of impact 
assessment in the risk management stage. See Case T-584/13, BASF Agro BV and Others v European 
Commission ECLI:EU:T:2018:279. 
